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The extension of contractor liability beyond delivery
is an essential element in contracting when complex weapons
systems are involved. Warranty/Guaranty clauses are currently
being included in shipbuilding contracts as a means of incen-
tivizing contractors to provide quality workmanship and
materials. The authors have investigated the results of one
Warranty/Guaranty effort, the U.S. Navy's Spruance Class
Shipbuilding Program, and constructed a Cost-Effectiveness
Model to evaluate actual performance on three ships of that
Class. Lessons learned are identified and presented which
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I. INTRODUCTION
The extension of contractor liability beyond delivery is
an essential element in contracting when complex weapons
systems are involved. Modern weapons platforms are so tech- —
-
nically complex that it is virtually impossible to test and
accept them in a short period of time. Quality assurance and
acceptance testing must be performed under actual conditions,
which necessitate warranty periods that extend well beyond
the initial delivery date.
Warranty/Guaranty clauses are currently being included
in shipbuilding contracts as a means of incentivizing con-
tractors to provide quality workmanship. By putting the
contractors on notice that they will be held accountable for
defective workmanship and materials, these clauses provide
the government' a contractual right to assert claims regard-
ing defects discovered after acceptance of the weapons
system, and they set forth the rights and obligations of
both parties. Warranty clauses are specifically written not
to narrow any rights afforded the government under the pro-
visions of the inspections clause relating to latent defects,
fraud, and gross mistakes.
"These rights include correction of deficiencies or defects,
reperformance , and equitable adjustment in the contract
price or other remedies as required." [Ref. 1]

Various contract types and warranty coverage periods
have been used in the past. Extensive literature searches
indicate no prior effort has been made to review a completed
warranty program of this type in order to identify lessons
that might have been learned, evaluate those lessons, or
make recommendations which could be incorporated into future
warranty/guaranty policy. This thesis will attempt to iden-
tify, based on three case studies of DD-963 class ships,




The major focus of this thesis is to review the Spruance
class destroyer (DD-963) warranty/guaranty program. The
methodology is in-depth case study on three ships of the
class. The goal is to review the actual performance of the
contract warranty/guaranty provisions in order to arrive at
lessons learned. "hese lessons could become the basis for
future planning of shipbuilding warranty/guaranty coverage.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Was there an underlying pattern for deficient work
identification throughout the Spruance class destroyer
acquisition program?




3. What was the optimal length of time for the warranty
period in this shipbuilding program based on the historical
data reviewed?
4. How effective was the Navy's maintenance and material
management (3M) system in recording warranty/guaranty work
items and ship's force man hours expended in support of the
warranty/guaranty coverage?
5. Should the lessons learned on this particular ship-
building contract clause be incorporated in future shipbuild-
ing contracts to reduce contract costs?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This research is limited to :he Spruance class
(DD-963) shipbuilding program. Other shipbuilding programs
will not be discussed or compared. Three Spruance class
ships, USS Leftwich (DD-934) , USS Thorn (DD-988) and USS
Fletcher (DD-992) , will be investigated within the framework




Operational scheduling considerations of new con-
struction ships are complex. The possible scheduling problems
created by the shortening of the warranty period were not
researched.
3. Assumptions
It is assumed that the reader of this thesis has a
basic knowledge of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, U.S. Navy
11

weapons systems acquisition process and U.S. Government
procurement policy.
It has also been assumed that the length of a war-
ranty period directly affects the amount of risk a contractor
is exposed to in warranty programs. Increased risk translates
to increased cost for the government.
D. METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted in three phases. An initial
literature search was conducted to gain a basic understand-
ing of the warranty concept and the Spruance class shipbuild-
ing effort. This was followed by extensive archival research
of cost data, work deficiency reports and ships' histories.
Statistical techniques were used to reduce the data and pro-
vide insight into trends that occurred. A cost -effect iveness
model was constructed to analyze the actual performance of
the warranty/guaranty program on three ships of the class.
Finally, a more detailed literature review was pursued and
several interviews were conducted with representatives from
the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Supervisor of Shipbuild-
ing, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) , Pascagoula, Mississippi,
and Ingalls Shipbuilding, Litton Industries to develop the
issues
.
1 . Initial Literature Search
The primary source of literature in this search was




This provided background articles and presentations on




The records of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Con-
version and Repair, Pascagoula, Mississippi and Ingalls
Shipbuilding Division of Litton Industries provided back-
ground information and cost data on the program.
3 Interviews
Two approaches were used in interviews: telephone
interviews were used for people in the Naval Sea Systems
Command and personal interviews were conducted with repre-
sentatives from both Ingalls and SUPSHIP Pascagoula.
4 Detailed Literature Search
A computer search of the ABI/INFORM database was
conducted by the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgrad-
uate School using the descriptors warranty, guaranty, and
contracts. There were many recent articles and studies on
reliability improvement type warranties and related issues
but it was found that little information existed on warranties





II. THE STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE OF
THE DD-963 WARRANTY GUARANTY/PROGRAM
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief over-
view of the DD-963 contract, to identify the applicable
contract articles which governed the program, and to describe
the manner in which the program was conducted. Article XII
WARRANTY PERIOD and the standard operating procedures for
implementation and execution of the warranty form the basic
framework for this discussion. Analysis of the financial
and maintenance data will be examined in a subsequent chapter.
A. DD-963 CONTRACT REVIEW
The DD-963 contract is the largest single shipbuilding
contract ever awarded by the U.S. Navy, a total of 30 destroy-
ers. It represents a new contracting approach wherein design,
engineering, construction and fleet readiness were all pro-
vided by a single contractor under a fixed-price incentive
contract. Both Litton Industries and the U.S. Navy at the
time of contract award in 1970 realized it would be difficult
to accurately estimate all costs that would be incurred
during the eight years of ship design, engineering and pro-
duction. As a result, an agreement was made on cost param-
eters which provided for negotiation to determine the final
price for the ships midway through the contract , when more
accurate estimates could be obtained. This negotiation
14

process went through several iterations which began in
October 1973 and ended 30 July 1978. Contract modification
P00064 implemented a settlement agreed on by both parties
based upon an estimated total allowable cost. The Secretary
of Defense determined that the agreement would facilitate
national defense and could be processed under the authority
of Public Law 85-804. The entire controversy surrounding
the claim, court proceedings and final resolution is not
considered to have had a significant effect on the execution
of the Warranty/Guaranty program other than serving to in-
demnify the contractor from claims based on design and
engineering : :aults as covered in Article XI of the contract.
Article XI is contained in Appendix A herein; however, the
effects of the article are not considered by this study.
The boilerplate articles, XXII Contractor Personnel (Warranty
Engineers) and XXIII Capture and Detention, are also contained
in Appendix A for the convenience and reference of the reader.
These articles are self explanatory in nature and do not
enter into the analysis that follows. As of this writing,
approximately three years after the delivery of the last
ship, the DD-963 contract closeout is still being negotiated.
1 . Article XII Warranty Period
The following contract article provided the majority
of Warranty guidance in the DD-963 program.
15

ARTICLE XII. WARRANTY PERIOD
(a) The Contractor warrants that for a period of
twelve (12) months of unrestricted service after delivery
of each vessel constructed and delivered under this con-
tract, each vessel shall be free from defects in material
and workmanship. Upon deliver)' of each vessel, the Con-
tracting Officer shall give the Contractor written notice
of the proposed expiration date: of this warranty. The
Warranty Period shall be extended for any period in which
a vessel is unavailable for unrestricted service due to
defects in material or workmanship, or correction of design
and engineering deficiencies under Article XI of this con-
tract. When such defect is corrected and the vessel is
again available for unrestricted service, the Contracting
Officer shall give the Contractor written notice of the
revised expiration date of this warranty.
(b) The Contractor ma)', at its own expense, main-
tain on board each vessel , a warranty engineer who shall
be afforded every reasonable opportunity to inspect such
vessel in all its parts except for such areas as may be
restricted because of military security. Such warranty
engineer shall have no power to direct or control the oper-
ation of said vessel or vessel:;. In the event a warranty
engineer decides that maintenance procedures are not being
accomplished or that operating procedures are not being
accomplished or that operating procedures in use will in
any way void any part of this warrantyp^he shall immediately
notify the Commanding Officer of the^wh^p, the Supervisor,
the Contracting Officer, and the Projext Manager, DX/DXG
Project, Washington, D.C.
(c) The Contractor shall at its own expense correct
any and all defects which constitute a breach or breaches
of this warranty. The C>cvernment shall notify the Contractor
in writing within thirty (30) days of discovery of any
conditions which are deemed to be covered by this warranty.
The Government shall have the option of correcting the con-
dition aboard the vesse] at its location, having the condi-
tion corrected at the nearest repair yard to the vessel's
location, or, whenever the condition will not interfere
with the continued operation of the vessel, having the vessel
returned to the Contractor's shipyard for correction of the
condition. In the event such condition requires immediate
correction in order to continue the safe operation of the
vessel, the Government shall notify the Contractor in
writing within five (5) days after the discovery of the
condition and before repair, if practicable. When due to
emergency conditions or due to election by the Government
corrective action is taken at a location other than the
Contractor's yard, an invoice shall be furnished to the
16

Contractor for services rendered and shall be duly certified
by the Government that:
(i) all such services were required to accomplish cor-
rections which are deemed to be the responsibility of the
Contractor under this Article;
(ii) all such services were required under emergency con-
ditions or were required to be performed under c ircumstances
where Contractor personnel were not reasonable available;
(iii) a copy of all data available to the Government con-
cerning such repairs has been made available to the Contrac-
tor or will be made available upon request;
(iv) payment has been made by the Government for such
services. Promptly upon receipt of any such invoice , the
Contractor shall either pay the amount due, subject, however,
to the "Disputes" clause of this contract or shall negotiate
the amount due with the Contracting Officer.
(d) The liability of the Contractor under this
warranty is limited to the correction of defects in material
or workmanship in the vessels, and consequential, or special
damages are expressly excluded. The provisions of this
Article shall not be applicable to:
(i) Government- furnished equipment, materials, and sup-
plies, except the installation thereof;
(ii) accidents, misuse, abuse, improper operational pro-
cedures, or negligence by non-Contractor personnel;
(iii) repairs, corrections, replacements, alterations, or
additions by source other than the Contractor, except under
emergency conditions as herein provided.
(iv) damage caused by perils of the sea. rivers, or navi-
gation or by exposure to unreasonable environmental conditions
(v) replacement of DD-963 components in accordance with
the Maintenance Plan;
(vi) deficiencies caused by failure of the Government to
perform maintenance in accordance with the Plans of
Maintenance
.
(e) Failure to agree upon any determination to be
made under this clause shall be a dispute concerning a
question of fact within the meaning of the "Disputes" clause
of this contract.
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government pro-
vided in this clause are in addition to and do not limit
any rights afforded to the Government under any other clause
of this contract.
(g) Prior to establishment of the combined total
final price under Article XXI hereof "Incentive Price Re-
vision (Firm Target)" and prior to establishment of the
total compensation to be paid under paragraph (f) of Article
IV, "Compensation Under Contracts N00024-69-C-0283 and
N00024-70-C-0275" , all costs incurred, or to be incurred,
by the Contractor, in complying with this Article shall be
considered when negotiating the combined total final price
17

and the total compensation under Article IV and XXI. After
establishment of the combined total final price and the
total compensation to be paid, Contractor compliance with
this Article shall be at the Contractor's expense and at
no increase in the total final price and total compensation
to be paid. [Ref. 2]
2 . Contract Modifications
In the course of the contract, two contract modifi-
cations affected the Warranty/Guaranty articles of the con-
tract. Article XI was modified by P00042 on 23 July 1975.
This modification imposed a $900,000.00 ceiling on the cost
that the contractor could claim in providing warranty engi-
neers and support for administration of contractor obligations
under the contract provisions. Article XI was subsequently
deleted in its entirety by P00064, as part of the agreement
made between the Government and the contractor under the
authority of Public Law 85-804 in settlement of the dispute
as discussed earlier. This government concession ceded to
Ingalls' contention that contractor liability for design
and engineering ended upon acceptance of Ingalls' engineering
plans and drawings by NAVSEA, prior to entering the produc-
tion phase of the program. For the most part, these two
modifications were the only ones that affected warranty
coverage. Several modifications changed items from contrac-
tor provided material to government furnished which, in
effect, changed contractor liability in regard to the item;
however, decisions of this nature are made by the program
office and the effect on the warranty coverage is considered
when the decision is made.
18

B. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WARRANTY/GUARANTY PROGRAM
Two Navy organizations worked together in the acceptance
of new construction ships for the U.S. Government: the
Naval Sea Systems Command, represented by the onsite Super-
visor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) , and
the type commander (TYCOM) , represented by the Prospective
Commanding Officer (PCO) . The Fleet Introduction Team (FIT)
is responsible for functions of the Prospective Commanding
Officer until he is actually onsite and able to conduct his
own business. As the warranty period began at delivery with
the PCO well ensconced, FIT was not involved in the conduct
of the Warranty/Guaranty program.
1 . The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
Repair
SUPSHIP Pascagoula served as the Administrative
Contracting Officer for the DD-963 contract. To aid in
management and control of the Warranty/Guaranty program
SUPSHIP Instruction 4330. 8A was promulgated providing policy
guidance in Warranty/Guaranty issues. The instruction
designated the Contracting Officer, Code 400, as the primary
office within the SUPSHIP organization responsible for
Warranty/Guaranty coordination. Code 400 was tasked with
the following duties with regard to the Warranty/Guaranty
program.
(a) Upon ship delivery, advise the contractor, the
Prospective Commanding Officer of the ship, and
other interested parties of the specific start and
19

contractual completion date of the guarantee (or
warranty) period and, should the ship be determined
by competent authority to be removed from unrestricted
service during the period, the revised expiration
date.
(b) Provide a Warranty/Guaranty information package to
the ship's Prospective Commanding Officer and depart-
ment heads and make an oral presentation on Warranty/
Guaranty requirements to the ship's force (department
heads) prior to delivery of each ship.
(c) Maintain a file and the status of work items sub-
mitted under the program by the ship and coordinate
the resolution of all rejected or disputed work items.
(d) Coordinate all SUPSHIP action required to ensure the
contractor fulfills his responsibilities under the
Warranty/Guaranty provisions.
(e) Follow all high priority work items to ensure the
contractor is taking appropriate action.
(f) Maintain a file of all open casualty reports sub-
mitted during the Warranty/Guaranty period of each
ship. «
(g) Coordinate with SUPSHIP Code 151, 154, 200, 300, and
500 for identification of, correspondence concerning,
and successful resolution of all DD Class performance,
maintainability, and reliability defects.
(h) Plan necessary responses to disputed Warranty/Guaranty
defects including the drafting of legally sufficient
contractual language to insure that government rights
are preserved.
(i) Control all design deficiency activity including
issuing administrative control numbers, tracking for
timely responses, advising NAVSEA counterparts, and
providing monthly status reports of latest activity.
(j) For those contractor responsible workmanship or
material deficiencies corrected by ship's force or
other activity at the option of the Navy, request
from the party correcting the deficiency a statement
of manhours and/or material dollars expended.
(k) Forward to the manager of the proposal evaluation
division those deficiencies for which no manhour and
20

material estimates have been provided or for which the
estimate involved merits additional review, for the
development of Technical Analysis Reports (TAR)
.
(1) Execute modifications and/or invoice the contractor
for recovery of funds expended by the government for
correction of contractor responsible deficiencies.
(m) Monitor orders placed in support of warranty/guaranty
work items so that a mutually agreeable credit can be
obtained from the contractor if it is subsequently
determined that an item is a replacement under the
Warranty/Guaranty provisions of the contract. [Ref.
3]
2 . The Prospe c tive Commanding Officer
The Commanding Officer (CO) of each new construction
ship was responsible for the identification and reporting of
Warranty/Guaranty discrepancies. Ship's force personnel
served as inspectors who ultimately accepted or rejected
work items submitted. r "he CO would designate a Warranty/
Guaranty Officer who would coordinate shipboard efforts,
provide continuity and act as point of contact onboard the
ship for the Warranty Engineer. The reporting and manage-
ment system utilized the existing Navy Maintenance and
Material Management (3M) system, supply system, and Casualty
Report (CASREP) system. Use of existing systems reduced
redundant reporting requirements and ensured additional
reporting requirements would be held to a minimum. Addition-
ally, by utilization of fleet systems it was hoped that the
system would be readily understood by the fleet personnel




The vehicle used by ship's force personnel to
communicate Warranty/Guaranty deficiencies was the standard
OPNAV 4790. 2K, Ships Maintenance Action Form (2K) which was
prepared and submitted at the workcenter level. The entries
required on the 2K were essentially the same as required for
any other maintenance action with the following exceptions:
(1) The first line of the remarks block (Number 35) must
be annotated as follows: "Warranty Item 992-xxx"
(Hull Number-Serial number)
(2) Block 46 must contain the letters "WG"
.
b. Distribution of Documentation
Distribution of the 4790. 2K was expanded to
include the activities concerned with the Warranty/Guaranty
program. Warranty/Guaranty 2K's were distributed as follows:
(1) Two copies to the Ingalls Warranty Engineer.
(2) One copy retained for the shipboard coordinator's
file.
(3) Two copies were submitted to the ship's 3m coordina-
tor for submission to the Navy's Maintenance System.
(4) One copy was forwarded to SUPSHIP Pascagoula, Code
451.
(5) One copy was forwarded to NAVSEA PMS-389.
c. Work Items Requiring CASREP Reporting
If a warranty item denigrated the ship's capa-
bility to the point where the problem was designated a
casualty by the CO, a casualty report was forwarded via the
normal CASREP reporting system. The CASREP message included
22

the Warranty/Guaranty serial number along with a statement
regarding the adequacy of the action being taken by the
contractor to correct the problem. CASREP reporting brought
high level review of any problems incurred and speeded com-
munication among the program managers and the operating units
d. Acquisition of Repair Parts
Repair parts required in the correction of
Warranty/Guaranty deficiencies were acquired on the following
bases
:
A. Normal acquisition of required warranty items was made
using the following procedures:
1. COSAL and/or parts with FSN/NSN part numbers wer^
acquired from Navy Supply System.
2. Other than COSAL and/or FSN/NSN parts or if not
available under 1 above were to be acquired by
Ingalls from vendors if possible upon notification
of warranty engineer assigned to the vessel.
3. If any part was not available from i and 2 tne
Contractor would take from production assets on a
"not to interfere with schedule" basis.
4. If not available under 1, 2, or 5, Ingalls was to
notify SUPSHIP that taking from production assets
could impact on delivery of production ships and
ask for guidance
.
B. Abnormal acquisition of parts required to prevent im-
pacting operational schedules of the ships were acquired on
the following basis:
1. Part was acquired by Al , A2 , or A3 whichever was
most expedient.
2. If the required part was not available under Bl
,




Repair parts consumed in support of the Warranty/
Guaranty Program requisitioned from the Navy System or paid
for utilizing Navy funds were charged against a special
budget operating target (OPTAR) which was provided each
ship by the cognizant Type Commander specifically for pro-
curement of warranty items. These OPTARs were maintained
and reports were prepared in accordance with Naval Supply
Systems Command Publication 3013. The Type Commander was
reimbursed by NAVSEA for any expenditures in support of the
Warranty/Guaranty Program. NAVSEA in turn was reimbursed by
the contractor for items or work paid for by the Navy in
support of the Warranty/Guaranty Program.
f. Reimbursement for Ship's Force Manhours Expended
The contractor reimbursed the Government for
documented Ship's Force manhours expended on Warranty/Guaranty
items. The hours expended were documented via the 2K and
managed on a quarterly basis in the review made by the Ingalls
Warranty Engineer. The amount due the Government was estab-
lished as the E-5 rate published and updated by the Navy
Comptroller (NAVCOMP) in NAVCOMP NOTICE 7041.
3 . Meetings
Once commissioned, Navy ships become part of a mobile
force which by nature does not remain in one place and is
usually involved in maintaining a hectic schedule. To facili-
tate incremental agreement and proper communication between
24

the ship, the contractor and the SUPSHIP organization,
several meetings were normally scheduled throughout the
Warranty period. The meetings were scheduled on a quarterly
basis between the Ingalls Warranty Engineer and the shipboard
coordinator. A final closeout conference was held that
included a representative from SUPSHIP Code 400.
a. Quarterly Review
The quarterly review was generally a low key
working meeting between the Warranty Engineer and the ship-
board coordinator. The agenda included ascertaining the
status of all work items, the status of the Warranty/Guaranty
OPTAR and the amount of ship's force manhours expended by
the ship. Agreement on these areas was generally obtained
and problem areas or items were discussed.
b. Warranty/Guaranty Closeout
Immediately prior to the expiration of the
Warranty/Guaranty period a final closeout conference was
scheduled. Representatives from Ingalls, SUPSHIP and ship's
force were in attendance. The purpose of the meeting was to
gain agreement and document three areas of concern: disputed
items, items that would remain open beyond the warranty
window, and the amount expended in ship's force manhours and
from the reimbursable OPTAR for material. At the close of
the meeting the Commanding Officer forwarded a letter to
SUPSHIP documenting the results of the meeting which provided
a major input to the ACO's negotiating position with regard
25

to the amount of money due the government for reimbursement
of manhours and material expended in support of the program
by ship's force.
4 . Summary
The DD-963 contract represents one of the largest
defense contracts ever entered into by the U.S. Government.
The scope and format of the contract make the DD-963 project
truly unique among shipbuilding programs.
The Warranty/Guaranty articles in the contract were
designed tc extend the contractor's responsibility for work-
manship, performance, design and reliability beyond final
acceptance of the vessels. As in any complex weapon system
acquisition there were a number of contract modifications;
however, for the most part the modifications had little
effect on the actual application of the warranty to the pro-
gram or. in the day-to-day administration of the warranty
provisions of the; contract.
The coordination between the Navy commands involved
in the administration of the program was well defined and
utilized the existing Navy 3M, Supply and CASREP reporting
systems to document and communicate problems that were iden-
tified. This maintained the extra reporting workload at a
minimum for the commissioning crew who were initially inun-
dated by the management problems involved in the commission-
ing of a new ship.
26

Meetings were conducted on a timely interval which
allowed problems to be resolved and agreement to be gained
on an incremental basis without evsr burdening the commis-
sioning crew xvhose time was already at a premium.
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III. COST EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
A. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
To date, and continuing into the foreseeable fir:ure
,
there exists no definitive set of inspection procedures
which absolutely guarantees the U.S. Government acceptance
of complex weapons systems with no defects in material and
workmanship. In the case of a Navy warship, this problem
leads to the question of whether to extend contractor lia-
bility beyond delivery and acceptance for costs of correct-
ing discovered patent defects. This problem faces :he Program
Manager and Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) as they
prepare to negotiate terms and conditions of any major ship
acquisition. They must answer the following questions:
(1) Do we want a Warranty/Guaranty clause in the contract?
(2) If so, what type of contract clause should be used?
(3) How long should the period of coverage be?
(4) How much money should be allocated for this purpose?
(5) What effect would this type of coverage have on the
contractor?
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary objectives of the Program Manager are to get
the new ship delivered at or under contract cost targets, on
or before required delivery date, with the minimum possible
defects still in existence after acceptance by the Government.
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He is constrained by the resources obligated to him , and
must choose an effective method of achieving these goals
within the cost limitations imposed. The objective of this
analysis is to determine the most cost effective way of cor-
recting defects in material and workmanship which are not
discovered in the inspection process. An assumption is made
that no additional efficiency in inspection procedures can
be achieved in the short term, and that some defective mate-
rial and workmanship items will exist at time of delivery
due to the complexity of the shipbuilding process.
C. ALTERNATIVES
Three alternative methods of achieving the objective
were considered:
1. Do not have a Warranty/Guaranty coverage period.
Description: This alternative requires that the correction
of defective material and workmanship be done by the ship's
company using their own labor and materials, or by acquiring
assistance from navy repair facilities or external contractors.
2. Include a Cost Reimbursement Warranty/Guaranty clause.
Description: This alternative provides correction of the
defective material and workmanship by the prime contractor,
but all costs of corrective action are added to the total
cost of the contract.
3. Provide Warranty/Guaranty coverage for a specific
period of time after acceptance of the ship, but add the
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cost of this coverage to the total cost of the ship. A
maximum/minimum profit figure is negotiated based on actual
shi-p cost in relation to target cost. A maximum total amount
available for warranty work is established, and as each ship's
warranty costs are totalled, the total cost is credited to
the Warranty/Guaranty account, and the balance is the amount
available for the remainder of the ships.
Description: This method provides an incentive to the con-
tractor to perform efficiently and effectively, while limit-
ing the total liability of both the Government and the
Contractor to a pre-established amount. The lower the total
cost of each ship, the higher the contractor's profit up to
the maximum profit allowed. The contractor is guaranteed a
minimum profit per ship.
D. CRITERION
The Government criterion for choosing between these
alternatives should be fixed effectiveness, minimum marginal
cost. The objective is to correct as much defective material
and workmanship existing at the time of delivery, up to the
point where the marginal benefits obtained from correction
at least equal the marginal costs for the Warranty/Guaranty
clause being extended an additional increment of time. Once
the desired effectiveness level is set, the length of time
for which the marginal benefits at least equal the marginal
costs should be selected, all other things considered equal.
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The assumption made here is that benefits can be quantified
in terms of dollars. Non-quantifiable benefits cannot be
ignored and will be addressed in all cases.
E . METHODOLOGY
The alternatives described as no Warranty/Guaranty
coverage aid cost reimbursement warranty coverage will not
be analyzed in depth. The U.S. Navy, in building the Spruance
class destroyer, recognized the problems which would be
associated with either of these alternatives. If no Warranty/
Guaranty coverage was afforded, the total repair effort would
be that of ship's company or Navy repair yards. This was
absolutely unacceptable because of operating requirements for
the new ships, and limitations on the availability of repair
facilities capable of this kind of repair effort. Further,
this approach does not motivate the contractor to deliver a
quality product, nor does it take advantage of his expertise
gained in production. Current repair efforts in the active
fleet plus the scheduled requirements of putting the new
ships through their initial shakedowns and adding new weapon
systems not already installed during construction do not
permit the total repair effort to be accomplished by the Navy.
Equally unacceptable would be the cost reimbursement method.
Assuming that the inspection procedures remain constant in
their effectiveness, a contractor would be disincentivized
to provide quality workmanship and materials. Any defects
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in these areas would be reimbursed dollar for dollar by the
Government. Overhead would effectively be spread over a
larger dollar base, and the contractor could actually "get
well" by performing lower quality work.
The third alternative lr.sted was, in fact, the method
selected by the U.S. Navy on the Spruance class shipbuilding
contract. This analysis supports their decision to select
this type of contract vehicle given the objectives to be
achieved. The evaluation w:.ll attempt to apply the criterion
discussed earlier to the performance of this type of Warranty/
Guaranty clause.
The method of this analysis is to explore, using three
ships of the Spruance Class, the results of this particular
effort by the U.S. Navy to solve the stated problem. Histor-
ical cost records and actual ships' schedules and maintenance
actions were compiled and evaluated. One frailty which
accrues to this method is obvious: archival records are only
as good as the original measurement and record keeping effort.
The cost data represents Ingalls' actual cost as recorded
and accrued for each ship's material and workmanship accepted
as deficient under the Warranty/Guaranty clause of the con-
tract. No additional profit was added to this cost objective.
The ship's schedules were distilled from Ships' Histories
filed with the Navy Type Commander to which that ship was
responsible for the periods concerned. Maintenance records




One other important aspect of the methodology must be
explained. Although the three ships were not selected at
random, as statistically defined, they were also not con-
trived to achieve a particular point. The three ships were
chosen for the completeness of the data available. They
also represent ships which have achieved relatively equal
efficiency in regard to information available to aid them
in their management tasks.
Raw data on the total cost and number of maintenance
actions for all ships were compiled (Appendix B) . This data
was summarized and compared for each of che selected ships
(Table I). Each selected ship's raw data was summarized
according to the occurrence of Warranty/Guaranty items during
its coverage period (Appendix B) and displayed graphically
(Appendixes C, D, and E) . Also compiled was the cumulative
work effort as it proceeded through the warranty period
(Appendix B) and this is presented graphically (Appendixes
F, G, and H) . A table of data summarizing each selected
ship's work effort accumulation is included (Table II).
In order to tie together the incurrence of warranty
items with the activities of each ship, a time line of key
events was added below the graph of weekly item frequency
(Appendixes C, D, and E) . This presentation of data allows
the analyst to view the results of a prior Warranty/Guaranty
effort and to evaluate the actual total costs per ship. The
patterns by which defective material and workmanship accrue
j j

can then be identified, particularly in relation to key
scheduled events during the warranty period. An assessment
of the length of time chosen for the warranty period in
relation to work accumulation and marginal benefits to the
Government can then be made.
From this framework, the objective of this analysis was
to evaluate cost and effectiveness of an existing Warrant)/
Guaranty clause and identify lessons learned for future
shipbuilding planning efforts.
F. EFFECTIVENESS AND COST ANALYSIS
1 . Assumptions
In order to evaluate the cost effectiveness of this
particular Warranty/Guaranty clause, data on the total cost
per ship, number and timing of defective workmanship and.
material reports, and individual ship's schedules during ^;he
Warranty/Guaranty period were compiled as described earlier.
The actual cost per work item was not retrievable from the
data collection system. This forced the usage of an average
cost per work item established by dividing the total cost
per ship by the number of work items per ship. Although the
analysis would be more precise using exact cost data, it is
felt that the nature of defective workmanship and material
discovery would have no correlation to the actual cost of
that defective work. Therefore, the higher and lower costs
would be randomly distributed throughout the Warranty/Guaranty
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period, and the use of an average cost per work item-is a
reasonable surrogate to the more precise actual costs.
Using the same rationale, a class average cost per
work item was established using the summary data for all
thirty ships of the class. The accuracy limitations of this
estimator are recognized; however, no attempt was made in
further refining the average cost in relation to the learning
curve that was occurring throughout the production period.
Each ship's total cost and number of work items had no
identifiable decreasing pattern that would indicate a pre-
dictable learning curve rate when applied to the Warranty/
Guaranty area. Again, based on the limitations of data
available, and a brief analysis of the patterns reflected
by that information, average cost per work item for the
whole Spruance Class shipbuilding effort was used in the
measurement of cost effectiveness.
2 . Effectiveness Model
Table I shows the average expense per 2K for each of
the sample ships. By plotting the frequency of work items
discovered for the fifty-two week Warranty/Guaranty period
for each ship (Appendixes C, D, and E) , and also analyzing
the cumulative total of work items discovered throughout
the period (Appendixes F, G, and H) , it became clear that
the effectiveness model needed to measure how long the
Warranty/Guaranty period should have been, given various




SUMMARY OF SHIPS DATA
SHIP NO. OF 2K TOT. W/G COST AVE.EXP-/2K
USS LEFTWICH 299 $160439.76 $536.76
OSS THORN 429 105637.27 246.24
USS FLETCHER 323 77640.58 236.71
I SAMPLE MEAN 352 114539.20
ADDITIONAL SUMMARY OF ALL SHIPS IN THE CLASS
j TOTAL 12283 $8119346.61 $661.02
MEAN 409.43 270644. 89
S"D. DEVIATION 173.16 262481. 78
OEF. OF DEV. 0.42 0.9 7
TABLE II
WARRANTY/GUARANTY WORK EFFORT ACCUMULATION
PERCENT COMPLETED

































NUMBERS ARE IN WEEKS AFTER DELIVERY




item accumulation and the length of time by summarizing
various effectiveness levels that were achieved throughout
the warranty period. Effectiveness level is defined as the
number of 2K's discovered by a certain time period divided
by the total number of 2K's discovered over the entire
twelve month warranty period.
3 . Cost Model
As discussed earlier, the cost model used average
costs. For each ship, it was assumed that the marginal
benefit accruing to that ship for any given period of time
was the number of work items discovered multiplied by the
average cost per work item for that ship, as identified in
Table I. The marginal cost of each additional period of
coverage was assumed to be the class average cost per ship
divided by the fifty-two weeks of coverage. As shown in
Table I, this class average cost was $270,644.89. The aver-
age cost per week was assumed to accumulate linearly over
the fifty-two weeks, with each week of coverage costing
$270,644.39/52 weeks = $5,205 per week.
By applying this analysis, a table consisting of
Effectiveness level (as defined in Table II), Week number,
Actual Benefit, Benefits Foregone (those yet to be discovered),
Net Benefit, and Marginal Benefit could be constructed.
Net Benefit is defined at any particular point during the
warranty period as the benefits actually accrued less those
remaining to be discovered. The marginal benefit is, from
37

week to week, the additional value of v/ork discovered by
continuing for that additional week. The final analysis must
determine for any desired minimum effectiveness level, what
length of time would have been optimal. This was established
by determining at what week, after a given effectiveness
level was achieved, the marginal benefits drop below the
additional marginal cost of extending coverage for that extra
week. This process forms the basis for the evaluation of
alternatives
.
G. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
1 . Quantif iables
Tables III, IV, and V summarize the data collected
using the cost effectiveness model described above.
Table VI summarizes the optimum number of weeks re-
quired to achieve effectiveness levels ranging from 75 percent
to 95 percent in increments of 5 percent.
Table VII shows the amount of dollars of repair per
ship remaining for which the Navy would be responsible if it
were to choose various effectiveness levels.
Table VIII displays the actual costs for a 9-month
Warranty/Guaranty period arrived at by applying incremental
analysis to the data from Table III. Also, budgeted costs
using the class average cost per ship, variances between
these two figures, and an analysis of whether the variance




OSS LSFTWICH - DD984
foCOMP WEEK NC ACT. 3
68.79 24 1 10085
70.31 25 113307








85.91 34 13747 2
87.92 35 140694



































































































favorable variance means that the actual ship's cost was
below the cost budgeted based on the Class Average Ship
Model discussed earlier.
2 . Sensitivity Analysis
In considering sensitivity, this model must be ana
lyzed for the areas in which it is based on assumption.




OSS THORN - DD988
f.COMF WEEK NC ACT. 3ZN E BENE LOST NET BENE BAR. BENE.
75.25 2U 7U784 24600
77. 48 25 76998 22386
81.93 26 81426 17958
85. 15 27 84624 14760
89.60 28 89052 10332
90.35 29 89790 9594
91.34 30 90744 8610
91.83 31 91266 8118
92.33 32 91758 7626
92.57 3 3 92004 7380
92.57 34 92004 7380
93.07 35 92496 6888
93.07 36 92496 6888
93.32 37 92742 6642
93.32 38 92742 6642
93.56 39 92988 6396
93.31 40 93234 6150
93.31 41 93234 6150
93.81 42 93234 6150
94.06 43 93480 5904
94.55 44 93972 5412
95.54 45 94956 4423
96.29 4 6 95694 3690
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would not change. The actual benefits and benefits foregone
are subject to change based on the previous decision to use
an average cost for each 2K. In order to test the sensitivity
of the model to this assumption, the data for actual benefit
and benefit foregone was changed to reflect a class average
cost per 2K. By making this change, the model would be tested




OSS FLETCHER - DD99 2
55COMP W3JEK NC ACT. BENE BENE LOST NET BENE MAR. BENE.
76.6 9 24 59250 18012
77
. 8 25 59487 17775
73.22 26 60435 16827
79, 14 2 7 61146 16116
79. 14 28 61146 16116
80.0 6 2 '3 61857 15405
80.98 30 62568 14694
84.05 31 64938 12324
84.36 32 65175 12037
87.7 2 3 3 67782 94 30
91 .10 3 a 70389 6 873
92.94 35 71811 5451
9 3.25 3 6 720U8 5214
94.48 3*' 72996 4265
94.79 38 73233 4029
95.40 39 73707 3555
96.01 40 74181 3081
96.93 41 74892 2370
97.8 5 4;i 75603 1659
98.16 43 75840 1422
99.69 4:. 77025 237





































Again the authors were restricted in using average costs,
but more precise data did not exist.
Tables IX, X, and XI summarize the model's output
using this class average cost per 2K in the same format as
Tables VI, VII, and VIII. In summary, this model appears to
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FIGURES i'.i AEF.RS AFTER COMMISSIONING
TABLE VII
REIAIR 'JOLLii.RS REMAINING ACTUAL
EFFECTIVENESS LEVEL









































NINE MONTH R/G PERIOD (39 WEEKS)
SHI? ACT COS? BUDGET COST VARIANCE ANALYSIS
USS LEFTWICH S149286 S2030CO $5^714 FAVORABLE
USS THORN 92983 2030t0 110012 FAVORABLE
USS FI2TCHE? 73^07 2030C0 129293 FAVORABLE
TABLE 13:
OPTIMUM H/G LENGTH - CLASS AVE MODEL
EFFECTIVENESS LEVEL
15% 30% 855 90*o 95*
USS LEFTWICH 29 30 37 38 46
USS THORN 29 29 2 9 2 9 4 6
USS FLETCHER 24 29 36 36 39
MEAN 27.33 29,33 34.00 34.33 43.67
STD. DEVIATION 2.89 0.58 U.3S 4.73 4.04
COEF. OF DEV. 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.09
FIGUFES IN iiESKS AFTER COMMISSIONING
T ^BLE X
REPAIR DOLLARS REMAINING CLASS AVE MODEL
EFFECTIVENESS LEVEL
15% 80^ 85% 90% 95%
USS LEFTWICH U0321 3 3999 19330 1734"7 5949
USS THORN 25779 2 5779 25779 25779 9915
USS FLETCHER 50236 4 2965 14542 14542 9915
MEAN 38779 35914 20050 19 3 89 3593
SID. DEVIATION 12301 8999 5622 5775 2290
COEF. OF DEV. 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.27





NINE MONTH H/G PERIOD (39 WEEKS) -CLASS AVE MODEL j
SHI? EUDGIT COST EST. BENE. VARIANCE ANALYSIS
!
[JSS LEFTWICH $203000 $133758 S192U2 UNFAVORABLE |
USS THORN 203000 249853 46358 FAVORABLE I
USS FLETCHER 203000 205571 2571 FAVORABLE |
!
TOTAL 609000 639137 30137 FAVORABLE |
i
Each ship in the class will have particular charac-
teristics which will affect the way defective work will be
discovered, and what defective work will be discovered.
This in turn will affect the patterns of work discovery for
that ship, and the total Warranty/Guaranty cost for that
ship. These factors may be reduced in variance by uniform
procedures and common, effective training on Warranty/Guaranty
program management, but unique circumstances facing each
ship will cause uncertainty in using average ship data as
was done in this analysis. The authors recognize this prob-
lem, but feel that using average cost data in this case was
still effective in highlighting possible areas of improvement
in the Warranty/Guaranty program planning.
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3 . Non -quant ifiables
In order to correctly make a decision about length
of time for a Warranty/Guaranty period, considerations other
than economic optimization must be analyzed. The primary
non-quantifiable was driven by the ships' schedules after
commissioning. Four key events seemed to drive the discovery
of deficient work. These were (1) Commissioning; (2) Initial
Shakedown; (3) Final Contract Trials; and (4) Post Shakedown
Availability. Since the final event, Post Shakedown Availa-
bility, could not reasonably be scheduled before approximately
the sixth month after commissioning (and the availability
usually required approximately two to three months) , Warranty/
Guaranty coverage should not be less than eight months. This
also allows the crew a reasonable period to operate the ship,
and discover problems which might fall in the Warranty/
Guaranty area.
#
H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Conclusions
Based on both quantifiable and unquantif iable infor-
mation presented above, the following conclusions can be
made :
(1) The twelve month Warranty/Guaranty program for the
Spruance Class Destroyer was too lengthy.
(2) Too much money was set aside for Warranty/Guaranty
items, since $42,000,000.00 was available, but only




Based on the model, the following recommendations
are made
:
(1) Nine months would be a more optimal length of time
for any shipbuilding program of similar size, nature, and
complexity as the Spruance Class Program. Based on the three
samples, 90 percent effectiveness would have been achieved
in all ships, with an average of only $9848 of repairs re-
maining to be handled by ship's crew. Also, the ships'
initial one-year schedules would not have to be altered.
(2) The amount of money set aside for Warranty/Guaranty
could be reduced to between 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent of
target cost for the ships.
(a) The contract, as written, provided the following:
For 12 months at 2 percent of Target Cost = $42000000
Actual Cost = 8119347
Excess Amount = 53880653
(b) If the Warranty/Guaranty period was reduced to nine
months the following would have been provided using the
same approach:
9/12 x 2% = 1.5% of Target Cost = $31500000
Estimated Cost = 6090000
Excess Amount = 25410000
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(c) If nine months at 1% Target Cost = $21000000
Estimated Cost = 6090000
Excess Amount = 14910000
(d) If nine months at 0.5% of Target Cost = $10500000
Estimated Cost = 6090000
Excess Amount = 4410000
With between four and fifteen million dollars in
excess of what the model suggests is needed for the Warranty/
Guaranty program, the Procurement Contracting Officer and
Program Manager would have the necessary risk insurance
available for the uncertainties of the shipbuilding program.
Gross overestimation could be reduced.
(3) This model should serve only as an example of a lesson
learned for the Spruance Class shipbuilding program. Its
lessons may be applicable to length of Warranty/Guaranty
periods for new shipbuilding programs, and negotiated amounts
set aside for those programs. The study and judgement of
Program Managers and Contracting Officers must still be the




The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the internal
control procedures utilized in the DD-963 Warranty/Guaranty
program, identify any weaknesses and recommend changes that
could improve future shipbuilding warranty programs.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) defines internal control as follows:
"Internal control comprises the plan of organization
and all of the coordinated methods and measures adapted
within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accu-
racy and reliability of its accounting data, promote
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to pre-
scribed management policies." [Ref. 4]
This definition describes systems used by management person-
nel in the maintenance of data base information from which
they will learn and base future decisions. The system of
internal control in the DD-963 Warranty/Guaranty program
was established in most part by utilization of two existing
Navy reporting systems. The Budget Operating Target (OPTAR)
system was used to collect obligation information on material
ordered and used in support of the program. The Maintenance
and Material Management (3M) system was used to document and
communicate discrepant work items and the number of manhours
expended by Navy personnel in support of the program. The




A. "OPTAR REPORTING SYSTEM
The basic procedure used by the Navy to recoup Government
funds expended in support of the Warranty/Guaranty program
was discussed in Chapter II. Table XII contains the amount
of money which the case study ships reported obligated via
the Commanding Officers' closeout letters to the Supervisor
of Shipbuilding. These figures were the amount SUPSHIP
(Code 400) used as the basis for negotiation in settlement
of contractor liability for Government furnished material
and supplies in support of the Warranty/Guaranty program.
The amount was a simple summation of the OPTAR balance in
the special OPTAR account obligated by the ship until the
end of the Warranty/Guaranty period,. This procedure provided
accurate obligation information as of the date of submission;
however, due to the Navy accounting system and the basic
difference between obligations and expenditures the procedure
produced built-in anomalies.
An obligation is a legal reservation of funds whereas an
expenditure is an actual disbursement in settlement of a
government debt. Operating units order material and obligate
funds to cover the estimated cost. As actual expenditures
are made by paying activities in payment of the materials,
the operating unit is informed by the accounting activity of
the actual expenditure amount. This closes the loop and





USS THORN 37, 24 'I.
USS LEFTWICH $22,374.17
USS FLETCHER 34,121,37
as necessary to bring its records into agreement with the
actual amount of the expenditure.
No mechanism was employed to keep SUPSHIP (Code 400]
informed of changes in OPTAR obligations. Because of the
lag time in the accounting system this created the potential
for significant error in the amount of money recouped from
Ingalls in settlement of government furnished materials and
services
.
B. 3M REPORTING SYSTEM
The internal control mechanism utilized to document and
communicate work items, and as a related issue manhours ex-
pended, was the 3M system as outlined in Chapter II. The
authors initially intended to utilize the maintenance data
base maintained by the Navy Maintenance Support Office (NMSO)
as a major resource for this thesis. In theory, all 4790. 2K's
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written by fleet vessels are input to the data base and are
available for review and study by Navy and government activ-
ities interested in studying maintenance related problems.
A special report was designed by NMSO [Ref. 5]. The report
was designed to sort maintenance actions by unit identifica-
tion codes and the special purpose code block 46 where "WG"
was to be placed on all Warranty/Guaranty 4790. 2K's. The
results of the effort were not satisfactory as only 2670
maintenance actions were retrieved of the 12,283 actually
submitted to Ingalls warranty engineers (21.7 percent).
After it was ascertained that the report was correctly pre-
pared and no further improvement could be expected short of
requesting an all inclusive report containing all maintenance
actions for each unit identification code within a given
timeframe, it was determined that it was simply not practical
to utilize the data base as a resource. The reason for this
discrepancy in reporting is addressed below.
The alternate method developed to obtain actual data was
to secure contractor copies of the actual 4790. 2K's submitted
by three ships. Table XIII contains the number of manhours
reported via the Commanding Officers' closeout letters of
the case study vessels along with statistics taken from the
contractor's copies of the actual 4790. 2K's which were sub-
mitted. The manhour breakdown consists of the sum of the
hours annotated in block 25, ship's force manhours expended,








(1) (2) (3) (<0 (5) (6)
299 6 81 21 467 2720
429 31 129 31 2001 2418
328 12 12 37 275 2959
ii
Number of 4790. 2K's submitted. /\
Number of 4790. 2K's lost and unavailable for review.
Number of 4790. 2K's rejected by I Stalls.
Number of 4790. 2K's accepted for material only.
Number of mar.hours reported via closeout letter.
Number of manhcurs annotated Dn 4^90. 2K's.
2K' 5 not specifically annotated by the warranty engineer
as 'material only". Table XIII also contains information
on the disposition of the work items submitted.
There exists a significant spread in the figures sub-
mitted by the CO at warranty closeout and the figures tallied
on the actual 2K's. After analysis this difference has been
attributed to several factors
:
1. Poor record keeping.
2. Work items accepted for material only, and
3. Negotiation of manhours by shipboard personnel.
1 . Poor Record Keeping
There is little doubt that record keeping alone con-
tributed to the spread in the figures in Table XII, columns
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5 and 6. The fact that only 21 percent of the warranty work
items could be retrieved from the NMSO data base indicates
that substantial error was introduced into the system via
inaccurate maintenance records keeping by shipboard personnel
2 . Mater i als Only Work Items
No provision was made in the contract articles for
work items being accepted on a materials only basis. The
case study statistics indicate 10.7 percent of all accepted
work items were accepted with this caveat. This is a sig-
nificant informal modification to the contract articles that
was made at the shipboard level.
3
.
Negotiation of Manhours by Shipboard Personnel
Determination of fault for warranty items is diffi-
cult when so many variables are involved. Factors such as
operator error, Improper maintenance and consequential damage
reach across a large "gray" area where judgement must be
applied on the part of both shipboard and contractor person-
nel. These complexities forced both parties to seek middle
ground on a number of work items. The middle ground utilized
was the "material only" acceptance by Ingalls. Other impasses
were solved by "horse trading" manhours for acceptance of
work items that were disputable as to whether or not the con-
tractor was at fault. These compromises were not found to
be abused, but they were widely utilized to accommodate




C. PRECOMMISSIONING CREW TRAINING
Internal control systems must be understood and utilized
by managers if they are to be effective. The sophisticated
crew training and phasing plan for the Spruance class destroyer
program was developed and implemented to ensure that manpower
assets were available and properly trained when required by
the ship delivery schedule. Unfortunately, very little con-
sideration was given in the extensive plan to providing supply
and maintenance management personnel the requisite training
required to understand the contract articles, their applica-
tion, and the intricate process involved in the acceptance
of a new construction ship for the Navy. The only formal
training provided the precommissionir g (PRECOM) crew was the
two-hour Warranty/Guaranty lecture piovided by SUPSHIP. The
remainder of the learning process was to be conducted as on-
the-job training. This lack of knowledge placed the PRECOM
crew at a disadvantage working in a complex government and
contractor management structure. The Commanding Officer was
clearly charged with the responsibility of acceptance of the
new construction ship. His success depended on his ability
to articulate requirements via the proper channels and manage
the efforts of people and organizations outside his normal
chain of command. To facilitate this type of management
effort a solid training program for ship's officers and chief
petty officers is required.
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As contained in Table XII the number of rejected work
items, 222, amounted to 21 percent of the total discrepancies
submitted. There were only two reasons for the rejection of
these work items: either the work item involved government
furnished material or it was considered to be routine main-
tenance and not a material failure. The repetitive submission
of work items that clearly fell into these two categories
indicates a low level of understanding of the Warranty/
Guaranty program by shipboard personnel. A cursory training
program could have greatly improved the level of understanding
of the PRECOM crew.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Internal control would be enhanced if the following
mechanisms could be adjusted to communicate the required
information to the proper manager in a timely fashion. The
emphasis here is the correction of deficiencies, not the
actual vehicle used. Each shipbuilding program is different
in scope and the control systems will require individual
structuring to meet the needs of the program.
The Supervisor of Shipbuilding should have available to
him more timely information regarding the expenditure of
government funds for warranty items. This could be accom-
plished any number of ways, such as including SUPSHIP in the
reporting system or giving him the responsibility for the
reimbursable fund instead of the type commander, but it is
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absolutely necessary he have access to expenditure informa-
tion in a timely fashion.
Provisions should be included in the contract vehicle
to provide guidance regarding documentation of ship's force
manhours expended and discrepancies accepted on a "material
only" basis. These provisions should be written so as to
grant the people on the waterfront the authority to come to
terms with difficult work items and still be held accountable
for their actions. By not addressing this issue, and hence
allowing negotiation to occur between the ship and the War-
ranty Engineer without any guidance or review, no attempt
to manage or maintain accountability is made.
The personnel training pipeline in the U.S. Navy for new
construction ships is long and complex. That fact is recog-
nized and no matter how much training is provided for a
PRECOM crew, more could be justified. It is not the intent
of this study to add to an already lengthy training pipeline;
however, there was very little training provided the officers
and crew on industrial management in a shipyard environment.
It is essential that industrial management be understood by
PRECOM personnel prior to the formation of the PRECOM crew.
On-the-job training, or learning-by-mistakes is costly to
the Navy as each PRECOM crew is formed of itself, and no
corporate knowledge exists to guide crew members. This over-
sight allows the same problems to occur over and over on each




The internal control system established and used in the
DD-963 program using established Navy reporting routines was
flexible, and encouraged adherence to management policy.
However, the system did not provide the ACO with timely ex-
penditure information nor did it provide the adequate flexi-
bility and guidance that was required by shipboard personnel
who were involved in actual negotiations regarding work item
acceptance and government material and manhours expended.
The system could be used as a model for future shipbuilding
programs, providing the system shortcomings identified above
are corrected. Caution is advised when using any control
system as a model; control systems should be tailored expressly
for the individual program, taking into consideration the
program's own intricacies and the reporting requirements of
the program managers involved.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are many issues confronting the Program Manager
and Procurement Contracting Officer when making decisions
about major shipbuilding programs. After reviewing just one,
the Warranty/Guaranty decision, it appears that several
lessons emerge. Conclusions are presented first, followed
by recommendations.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The nature of modern military shipbuilding requires
a mechanism for extension of contractor liability beyond the
initial delivery date. Quality assurance and acceptance
testing must be performed under actual conditions. Defective
material and workmanship should be the responsibility of the
contractor and the Government should have the right to assert
claims regarding defects discovered after acceptance of the
ship
.
2. The DD-963 shipbuilding program represented a new
contracting approach wherein design, engineering, construc-
tion and fleet readiness were all provided by a single con-
tractor under a fixed-price incentive contract for a total
of 30 modern destroyers. Lessons learned should, therefore,
be applicable to shipbuilding efforts conducted under similar
conditions of uncertainty and contract structure. Plans for
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future shipbuilding efforts could incorporate lessons learned
from this effort.
3. Even though the DD- 963 shipbuilding contract was not
executed totally as planned, and many problems arose during
its execution which severely changed the basic contract
structure, the Warranty/Guaranty effort was executed as orig-
inally conceived.
4. The management control techniques used by the ship
during the Warranty/Guaranty period were the same used in
normal fleet operations. The coordination between the Navy
commands involved in the administration of the program was
well defined and utilized the existing Navy 3M, Supply, and
CASREP reporting systems to document and communicate prob-
lems that were identified. This maintained extra reporting
requirements at a minimum.
5. Review of the Warranty/Guaranty effort was held on
a timely basis, which allowed problems to be resolved and
agreement to be gained on an incremental basis without over-
burdening the ship's crew.
6. The primary objectives of a Program Manager are to
get a new ship delivered at or under contract cost targets,
on or before required delivery date, with the minimum possible
defects still in existence after acceptance by the Government.
A specific Warranty/Guaranty coverage period is the best
method available to achieve this, assuming no additional
efficiency in inspection procedures can be achieved in the
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short run, and that defective material and workmanship items
will exist at time of delivery due to the complexity of the
shipbuilding process.
7. The economic objective for deciding the '.ength of
time a Warranty/Guaranty program should run is to correct as
much defective material and workmanship existing at the time
of delivery, up to the point where the marginal benefits
obtained from correction at least equal the marginal costs
for the Warranty/Guaranty clause being extended an additional
increment of time.
8. The twelve month Warranty/Guaranty program for the
Spruance Class Destroyer shipbuilding program was too lengthy
Too much money was set aside for Warranty/Guaranty items in
the initial contract, indicating an overestimati Dn of the
production uncertainties and technical problems which were
actually encountered during the program.
9. No mechanism was employed in the Budget Operating
Target (OPTAR) System to keep the SUPSHIP Code 400 (Admini-
strative Contracting Officer) informed of changes in OPTAR
obligations. The lag in the accounting system between ob-
ligation and actual expenditure data created the potential
for significant error in the amount of money recovered in
settlement of government furnished materials and services.
10. The Maintenance and Material Management (5M) System
did not effectively capture data pertaining to the Warranty/
Guaranty efforts of each Spruance Class ship. Only 2670
60

maintenance actions were retrieved from the data base at
Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) out of the actual
12,283 submitted to Ingalls warranty engineers. This was a
poor 21.7 percent effectiveness.
11. Poor record keeping, work items accepted for material
only, and negotiation of manhours by shipboard personnel
caused a significant spread in the figures submitted by the
CO at Warranty closeout from those actually recorded on dis-
crepancy 2K's. This in turn caused a material misstatement
of funds actually expended by the Navy under the Warranty/
Guaranty clause, and reimbursable to the Navy by Ingalls.
12. Very little consideration was given in the extensive
crew training and phasing plan for the Spruance class destroyer
program for providing supply and maintenance management per-
sonnel with the requisite training required to understand
the Warranty/Guaranty contract article, its implications,
and the intricate process involved in accepting a new ship
for the Navy.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Nine months would be a more optimal length of time
for any shipbuilding program of similar size, nature, and
complexity to the Spruance Class program. The ship's first
year schedule could remain intact, and effectiveness in
correcting deficient material and workmanship would remain
at no less than 90 percent of that achieved after running
the program for one year.
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2. The amount of money set aside for Warranty/Guaranty
items could be reduced to between 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent
of target cost for shipbuilding programs of a similar com-
plexity rather than the 2 percent thumbrule used in the
Spruance class contract.
3. The Administrative Contracting Officer (in this case
Supervisor of Shipbuilding) should have available to him more
timely information regarding the expenditure of government
funds for warranty items. This could be accomplished by
including the ACO in the reporting system, or giving him the
responsibility for the reimbursable fund rather than the
Type Commander. In any case, the expenditure information
absolutely must be made available to the ACO in a timely
manner
.
4. Provisions should be included in the contract to
provide guidance regarding documentation of ship's force
manhours expended and discrepancies accepted on a "Materials
Only" basis. These provisions should give responsible agents
on the waterfront the authority to resolve issues arising
from difficult work item responsibilities, and still ensure
accountability for their actions. Allowance of negotiations
between the ship and warranty engineer without any guidance
or review caused a loss of efficiency and accountability on
the part of the Government for money available for recovery
under the Warranty/Guaranty clause.
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5. It is essential that better training on industrial
management in the shipyard be afforded PRECOM crews. On-
the-job training which occurred on the Warranty/Guaranty
program did not provide the level of knowledge necessary to
ensure efficient, effective discovery, documentation, report
ing . and resolution of issues arising under the Warranty/
Guaranty program.
6. These lessons learned may be applicable to ship-
building efforts in the future. The study and judgement of
Program Managers and Contracting Officers must still be the







The provisions of the DD-963 contract which provided for
the Warranty program are contained in the following articles
taken from the actual contract.
ARTICLE XI. PERFORMANCE, MAINTAINABILITY, AND RELIABILITY
GUARANTEE
(a) The parties have: agreed that when the first accept-
able vessel (hereinafter referred to as the product Base-
line Vessel) has been delivered to the Government (at
which time Guarantee and Warranty commence) and has success-
fully completed its Final Contract Trials, all other
vessels will be constructed in strict conformity to that
Product Baseline
; except for any changes therein which may
be made in accordance with this contract. The contractor
guarantees that, notwithstanding inspection and delivery
of the vessels covered by this guarantee, it will at its
own expense correct any design and engineering deficiencies
in each of the vessels, provided, however, that the Plans
for Maintenance are complied with, and provided further
that the causes of any such deficiencies or excess main-
tenance are attributable to improper design or engineering
and not to human error or negligence. The guarantee shall
continue during the period from delivery to Final Acceptance
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of the fifth vessel. As used in this Article, design and
engineering deficiencies shall include deficiencies or
failures in the vessel (s) which result in the failure of
a system, subsystem or component to perform in accordance
with the Contract Specifications.
(b) Notwithstanding inspection and Final Acceptance
by the Government of each of the vessels constructed and
delivered under this contract, or any provision of this
contract concerning conclusiveness Thereof, the Contractor
guarantees that for a period of forty-eight (48) months
after final acceptance of the fifth vessel, each such
vessel will perform in accordance with the Contract spec-
ifications of this contract.
(c) The Contracting Officer shall give written notice
to the Contractor of any breach of the guarantees in para-
graphs (a) and (b) of this clause within thirty (30) days
*
of such breach. The Government shall have the option of
either correcting the condition aboard the vessel at its
location, having the condition corrected at the nearest
repair yard to the vessel's location, or, whenever the
condition will not interfere with the continued operation
of the vessel, having the vessel returned to the Contrac-
tor's shipyard for correction of the condition. In the
event such condition requires immediate correction, in
order to continue the safe operation of the vessel, the
Government shall notify the Contractor within five (5)
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days after the discovery of the condition and before
repair, if practicable.
(d) Within a reasonable time after such notice, the
Contracting Officer may either:
(i) by written notice require the prompt correction or
replacement of any supplies or part thereof by the
Contractor;
(ii) have the corrections or replacements made by a source
other than the Contractor and charge the cost thereof to
the Contractor. When corrective action is taken at a loca-
tion other than the Contractor's yard, opportunity shall
be given to a representative of the Contractor tc inspect
the deficiency and observe its repair, if practicable.
When such corrective action is taken, due to emergency
conditions or due to election by the Government at a loca-
tion other than the Contractor's yard, an invoice shrill
be furnished to the Contractor for services rendered and
shall be duly certified by the Government that:
(1) All such corrections are deemed to be the responsi-
bility of the Contractor under this Article;
(2) All such corrections were performed under emergency
conditions or under circumstances where Contractor
personnel were not readily available;
(3) A copy of all data available to the Government con-
cerning such corrections has been made available to
the Contractor or will be made available upon request;





Promptly upon receipt of any such invoice from the
Contracting Officer, the Contractor shall either pay the
amount due, subject, however, to the "Disputes" clause of
this contract or shall negotiate the amount due with the
Contracting Officer.
(e) The Contractor may, at its own expense, maintain
on board each Destroyer covered by this guarantee, a guar-
antee engineer who shall be afforded every reasonable
opportunity to inspect such vessel in all its parts except
for such areas as may be restricted because of military
security. Such guarantee engineer shall have no power to
direct or control the operation of said vessel or vessels.
In the event a guarantee engineer decides that maintenance
procedures are not being accomplished or that operating
procedures in use will in any way void any part of this
guarantee, he shall immediately notify the Commanding
Officer of the ship, the Contracting Officer, and the
Project Manager, Washington, D.C. A guarantee engineer
may be furnished under the provisions of this ARTICLE XI
or the provisions of ARTICLE XII, but not both.
(f) The liability of the Contractor under this guarantee
is limited to corrections to the vessels as herein provided,
and consequential or special damages are expressly excluded.
The provisions of this Article shall not be applicable to:
(i) Government -furnished equipment, materials, and sup-
plies, except the installation thereof;
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(ii) accidents, misuse, abuse, improper operational
procedures, or negligence by non-Contractor personnel;
(iii) repairs, correction, replacements, alterations, or
additions by a source other than the Contractor, except
under emergency conditions as herein provided;
(iv) damage caused by perils of the sea, rivers, or navi-
gation or by exposure to unreasonable environmental
conditions
;
(v) replacement of DD-963 components in accordance with
the Maintenance Plan;
(vi) deficiencies caused by failure of the Government to
perform maintenance in accordance with the Plans for
Maintenance
.
(g) The maximum and sole liability of the Contractor
under this guarantee article and the warranty provisions
(ARTICLE XII) of this contract shall be limited to
$42,798,000.00 "...which amount includes, but is not
limited to, the cost of providing guarantee and warranty
engineers and support for administering the Contractor's
obligations under ARTICLES XI, XII, and XXII of this con-
tract, provided that no more than $900,000.00 for guarantee
and warranty engineers and support shall be included in
the aforesaid $42,798,000.00 (added by p00064) M .
(h) The rights and remedies of the Government provided
in this clause are in addition to and do not limit any




ARTICLE XXII. CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL (WARRANTY ENGINEERS)
(a) The Contractor may retain representatives (herein-
after called "warranty engineers") to provide the Govern-
ment with expert services in connection with "Article XI-
Performance , Maintainability, and Reliability Guarantee,
and Article XII, Warranty Period, hereunder.
(b) The Contractor shall be responsible for selecting
personnel who are well qualified to perform the required
services; tc supervise techniques used in operating the
ships; and to in::orm the parties of improvements in methods
of ship operations.
(c) Contractor personnel, upon assignment, either within
the continental Limits of the United States or overseas,
are subject to call. 24 hours a day. Normally, they will
perform their assigned duties on the same daily and hourly
basis as the ship's company to which they are assigned.
Holidays will be observed in accordance with the direction
of the Commanding Officer of the vessel to which Contractor
personnel are assigned.
(d) The Contractor may furnish a replacement for any
Contractor personnel who may be returned to the Contractor's
plant or become incapacitated, or die, or otherwise be
unable to complete performance hereunder prior to the
expiration of the period of performance, unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties hereto.
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(e) The Contractor shall furnish all necessary equipment,
salaries and wages of its personnel, all costs of subsis-
tence and lodging, cost of passports, insurance, and and
all other costs in connection with the services to be
rendered except as otherwise provided in ARTICLE XXIV,
hereof, entitled SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT
(WARRANTY ENGINEERS)
.
(f) The Contractor shall furnish in writing to the
Contracting Officer the name of each person assigned by
the Contractor under this contract, his qualifications,
his security clearance, and such other pertinent informa-
tion as the Contracting Officer may request. The Contrac-
tor shall have the right to replace or transfer its
personnel and 10 substitute orher qualified personnel in
lieu thereof; provided, however, that such replacements
or transfers have been coordinated with the Contracting
Officer. Any transfers or reassignments shall be at the
Contractor's expense.
(g) The Contracting Officer may, if he finds it to be
in the best interest of the Government, direct the Con-
tractor to remove, and the Contractor shall remove, any
employee from an assignment to perform services under this
contract
.
(h) The Contractor shall furnish to and file with the




(i) Personnel employed by the Contractor hereunder and
sent overseas shall be accredited to the United States
Navy with a recognized status under the Hague Regulations
and the Geneva Covenants, shall be given proper credentials
and identification cards, shall wear a uniform when pre-
scribed by the Theater Commander, shall be subject to
appropriate recognition under the rules of war, and shall
be subject to such regulations as have been or may hereafter
be issued by the United States Navy governing Contractor
personnel serving with the United States Navy in foreign
theaters of operation.
ARTICLE XXIII. CAPTURE AND DETENTION
(a) As used in this clause:
(1) "captured person" means any employee of the Contractor-
(i) who is assigned to duty outside the United States for
the performance of this contract, and
(ii) who is found to be missing from his place of employ-
ment under circumstances that make it appear probably that
his absence is due to the action of the force of any power
not allied with the United States in a common military
effort, or who is known to have been taken prisoner,
hostage or otherwise detained by the force of any such
power, whether or not such person is actually engaged in
his employment at the time of capture; provided that at




(A) engaged in activity directly arising out of the
course of his employment under this contract, or
(B) captured in an area in which the captured person was
present only because such presence was required in order
to perform this contract;
(2) a "period of detention" begins with the day of capture
and continues until the captured person is returned to his
place of employment, or to the United States, or until
his death is in fact established or legally can be presumed
to have occurred by evidence satisfactory to the Contract-
ing Officer, whichever shall occur first;
(3) "United States" comprises geographically the fifty
states and District of Columbia;
(4) "War Risk Hazards Compensation Act" refers to the
statute compiled in Chapter 12 of Title 42 U.S. Code
(Sections 1701-1717), as amended.
(b) If pursuart to an agreement entered into prior to the
capture, the Contractor is obligated to pay and shall have
paid benefits to a captured person, or his dependents, on
account of his detention, the Government will reimburse
the Contractor for such payments up to an amount which will
equal the lesser of:
(i) the total wage or salary (computed at the rate being
paid at the time of capture) due from the Contractor to
the captured person for the period of detention, or
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(ii) that amount which would have been payable to such
person if the detention had occurred under circumstances
wherein the benefit provisions of the War Risk Hazards
Compensation Act would have been applicable.
(c) The period of detention shall not be considered as
time spent in the performance of this contract, and the
Government shall not be obligated to make payment under
this contract on account of such person for the period of
the detention except as provided in this clause.
(d) The obligation of the Government to make payments
provided for by this clause shall be applicable to the
entire period of detention except that it is expressly
conditioned upon and subject to the availability of funds
from which payment can be made. The rights and obligations
of the parties under this clause shall survive the earlier
expiration, completion or termination of this contract.
(e) The Contractor shall not be reimbursed under the pro-
visions of this clause for payments made to employees for
a period of detention during which the employees were
entitled to compensation for capture and detention under
the War Risk Hazards Compensation Act, as amended.
ARTICLE XXIV. SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT
(WARRANTY ENGINEERS)
In connection with services of warranty engineers to be
rendered here-under, the Government shall furnish and




(a) Use of Government communication facilities for the
exchange of messages between Contractor personnel and the
Contractor, where and when available if the Contractor is
unable to procure commercial communication services; but
the use thereof shall be subject to the regulations of the
representatives of the Government in charge thereof.
(b) Use of Government services and agencies in the trans-
mittal of funds to Contractor personnel and as medium of
commercial exchange for said personnel when adequate
commercial, services and facilities are not available.
(c) Contractor personnel assigned to DD-963 Class destroy
ers will De accorded the same privileges as commissioned
officers with regard to quarters, local transportation
and messiig, when available. Emergency medical services






!?ORK ItlBS SUBMITTED AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
HULL NAM 1: NO. 2K's EXPENDITURES
DD-963 SPRUANCE 431 $ 1,217,, 134.52




DD-966 HE W ITT 521 547,,938.67
DD-°6~ ELLIOT 448 406,,810.58
DD-968 ARTHUR RADFORD 384 346,,782. 34
DD-969 PETERSON 395 219,,250. 48
DD-9^0 CA R CN 384 113,,434.42
DD-971 DA 7 ID PAY 581 544,,747.28
DD-9^2 OLD END ORE 467 141,,360. 35
DD-973 JOHN YOUNG 499 152,,209.91
DD-974 COM IE DE GRASS
E
486 156,,246.49
DD-9^5 0« 3SIEN 286 395,,323.76
DD-976 ME R FILL 425 194,, 118.46
DD-97-7 BRISCOE 184 129,, 270.58
CONTINUED ON NEXT ?AGE
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WORK ITEMS AND EXPENDITURES (CONTINUED)




DD_9 81 JCH I HANCOCK 206
DD-982 NICHOLSON 233
DD-983 JOHN ROGERS 378
DD-984 LEETWICH 299
DD-985 CUSRING 337
DD-986 HARRY W HILL 246























USS LEFTWICH DD-984 WORK ITEM ACCUMULATION BREAKDOWN
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iOSS THORN BE-984 WORK IT EM ACCUMULATION BREAKDOWN
WEEK PRSQOENCT CUM. FREQUE NCY % 0? TOTAL
1 a 2 42 10. 40
2 44 86 21. 29
3 13 99 24. 50
4 3 107 26. 4 Q
5 8 115 23. 47
6 5 120 29. 70
7 7 127 31. 44
3 2 129 31. 93
o 12 1U 1 34. 90
10 2 1'4 3 35. 40
11 1U3 36. 63
12 5 153 37. 37
13 4 157 33. 36
14 n 174 43. 07
15 26 20 49. 50
16 "II 21 1 52. 23
17 13 224 55. a5
18 18 242 59. 90
19 ;i 263 65. 10
20 17 230 69. 31
21 a 288 71. 29
22 2 290 71, 78
23 7 297 73. 51
24 7 304 75. 23
25 9 313 77. 48
26 18 331 31. 93
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QSS FLETCHER WORK ITEMS (CONTINUED)


















































































NO. W/G ITEMS - OSS LEFTWICH
NO. W/G ITEMS - USS LEFTWICH
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NO. W/G ITEMS - OSS THORN
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PERCENT DISCOVERED - OSS FLETCHER
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The warranty guaranty clause
